Questions on Corporate Governance: for more innovative Japan

I developed a few key questions for my research purpose. I should address one of these for my dissertation in the Summer term.

• Firm-level question: how should top management (both executive officers and non-executive board members) of a Japanese company be governed by which stakeholder(s), if the Japanese corporate governance, either by debt, equity, or labour individually, cannot put right pressure on them? 
• What behavioural practices, or inertia of cultures, do inhibit the management from making timely and necessary decisions, going beyond the agency problem? Especially do the requirements to fiduciary duties of the board can be deflated and more aligned with the notion of limited liabilities of equity, even in Japan?
• As one possible solution, does the practice of introducing outside / independent directors, which is becoming increasingly common among the listed companies in Tokyo Stock Exchange, actually produce better performance in comparison to those who have not introduced them? 
• How should the corporate governance institutes and norms vary in terms of paths of monitoring managerial decisions and activities in different corporate phases, namely start-up, established private companies, established public companies, and those in distress? 
• Industry-level question: would it also be possible for plausible reforms to the Japanese corporate governance to facilitate innovations that are fundamentally necessary to be competitive in the world of global competition? 
• Does the corporate governance facilitate reallocation of resources from low-growth industries to high growth ones? Is it sufficient and responsive enough to explore innovations in new industries? If not, what would be the obstacles that prevent such shift? 
• To accelerate resource allocations among not only industries but also individual companies, what incentive is effective to facilitator scrap-and-build cycles in the economy, especially for consolidation and divesture?